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OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

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OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

by

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1952

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of the School of Government, Business, and International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction of the requirement for the degree of Master of Business Administration.

June 5, 1963

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PREFACE

The author attempted to approach the problem of managing officer personnel during a period of rapidly changing Defense methodology. Due to the difficulty of properly dealing with some of the factors involving the process, some areas of the research are more lengthy with respect to other areas. It should not be assumed that the length of any area discussion is a proper measure of its relative importance among the various topics covered. Rather, it is requested that the assumption be made that all areas are of about the same relative importance in the management process of officer personnel.

Finally, the research on a subject such as the one covered in this thesis can be done only in the nation's capital where the actual tasks are being performed, and the thesis can be written only by the encouragement and assistance of such a program director as A. Rex Johnson. For any student, bad or good, both of these ingredients are necessary in the study of government.

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CHAPTER I

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

In order better to understand the thesis problem a brief summary of the present system of financial management within the defense establishment is required.

Defense Financial Management

It was recognized by the Department of Defense in the spring of 1961, that two urgent improvements were required in defense financial management methods. First, a means of classifying military units in terms of their missions was required so that activities having similar missions could be more easily combined for decisions-making purposes. And, secondly, a serious need existed for an extension of the planning horizons in order to determine their long-range implications. As a result of these needs, a program system was developed, the seven major goals of which are: (1) to plan oriented around major missions rather than services, (2) to relate resources, manpower, material, equipment, etc., to military output, (3) to coordinate long-range planning with budgeting, (4) to appraise programs on a continuing basis,

(5) to control approved programs through timely progress reports, (6) to provide a capability for making cost-effectiveness studies of alternative force structures, and (7) to integrate the Office of the Secretary of Defense information systems in order to avoid duplication.[1]

As stated in a Department of Defense publication,

> Programming involves the planning and control of resources inputs to achieve a desired military output. It is concerned with the cost, feasibility, and effectiveness of meeting military requirements in order to get the greatest benefit out of any given resource expenditure. Although the programming function must be performed at each level in the DOD hierarchy, the system in this report is directed toward programming at the top level of the Department of Defense.[2]

Program Elements

The programming system is based upon the premise that the crucial decisions which determine overall military power are those determining the level, deployment, and composition of all military units. The military unit, the program element, is an

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[1]Department of Defense, A Study Report on the Programming System for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Programming, June 25, 1962, pp. I-1-I-3 (available in the files of the department).

[2]Ibid., p. II-1.

identifiable aggregate of men, equipment, and facilities constituting a military capability or support activity, i.e., attack carrier, strike force. All programs elements in total include all Department of Defense activities.[1]

All programs elements of like or complementary nature are grouped into nine major programs for decision-making purposes. These programs are: (1) Strategic Retaliatory Forces, (2) Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces, (3) General Purpose Forces, (4) Airlift and Sealift Forces, (5) Reserve and Guard Forces, (6) Research and Development, (7) General Support, (8) Civil Defense, and (9) Military Assistance Program.[2] An example of a program and some of its assigned program elements are shown in the following table.

Although Table 1, presents a rather clean hierarchial structure of programming, the process of defining each program in terms of program elements has been difficult, involving many compromises. One such major compromise in the formulation of program elements concerns the necessity for their being well-defined homogeneous aggregates of military functions. The smaller

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[1] Ibid., p. II-1.

[2] Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Program Change Control System in the Department of the Navy, NAVEXOS P-2416, August, 1962, p. iii (available in department files).

TABLE 1

PROGRAM AND PROGRAM ELEMENTS[a]

Aggregate Level		Aggregate Name
1	Program	General Purpose Forces
2	Element	Army Forces, Europe
3	Sub-Element	Combatant Forces
4	Sub-Sub-Element	Infantry Division
2	Element	Attack Carrier Strike Forces
3	Sub-Element	Attack Carriers
4	Sub-Sub-Element	CVAN[b]

[a]Extracted from: A Study Report on the Programming System for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Programming, June 25, 1962, Appendix A (available in department files).

[b]Nuclear Aircraft Carrier.

the element, the more homogeneous it can be made. However, the larger the number of elements the less able is the Secretary of Defense and his staff to make top-level decisions regarding the force composition. Presently, the goal ". . . is to define program elements at as high a level of aggregation as possible consistent with a high degree of homogeneity."[1] If this is done, successfully the variations of homogeneity in a program are considered to be insignificant at the Department of Defense level.

Many support activities are not easily allocated to a program element. And further, these support activities are not completely dependent upon combat force decisions. So, there must be another major compromise involving the program element, and that is the allocation of costs of these activities to the combat forces planned or in being. This is done in order to provide a capability for making cost-effectiveness studies of alternative force structures in terms of program elements.[2]

Resources

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), C. J. Hitch, states a major resource consideration of the programming system in a book he coauthored,

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[1] Ibid., p. II-3.

[2] Ibid.

> Resource limitations are our starting point because in all problems of choice we strive to get the most out of what we have. . . . Resources are always limited in comparison with our wants, always constraining our action.[1]

Resource categories have been established for the purpose of expressing program elements in terms of their resource requirements. Thus, explicit planning for the acquisition and financing of resources can be accomplished. A resource input is ". . . either a unique type of resource or a homogeneous grouping of related resources."[2] Whenever possible, the intent is to measure resources in terms of both dollars and quantities required. Resource categories summarized in terms of dollars and quantities required afford a convenient link to the budget as well as the best means for subsequent control of programs.[3] Conveniently, the annual budget submitted to Congress expressed in appropriation titles closely parallels programming resource categories.[4]

Relation of Program Elements and Resource Categories

It is important to realize that program elements and resource categories are merely two different ways of viewing the overall defense program. The planning related to program

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[1]C. J. Hitch and R. N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 23.

[2]Department of Defense, op. cit., p. II-4.

[3]Ibid., pp. II-3 and II-4.

[4]Ibid., p. II-10.

elements and the planning related to resources are both based upon the same total program. Therefore, they must be consistent, if the overall program is economically to be and successfully implemented.

All resource planning for each program element starts with present resources and ends with resources needed. The formula being used in programming is as follows: Net new requirements equals gross requirements minus beginning availability plus consumption or replacement.[1]

One of the prime objectives of relating the planning of resources to the planning of program elements deals with the determination of the costs of implementing a force structure. Or as stated by a Department of Defense pamphlet,

> The Programming System must contribute information for cost-effectiveness studies. In order to achieve the greatest overall military effectiveness from the large but not unlimited resources available for defense purposes, each activity within the DOD must provide a benefit justified by its cost. This requires that a methodical examination be made of alternative ways of accomplishing desirable military missions in order to select those weapons and forces which provide the greatest return for the defense dollar.[2]

The annual budget, broken down by appropriation titles, resource categories for practical purposes, and defense programs elements, can serve to illustrate the manner in which top-level defense decisions can be facilitated.

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[1] Ibid., p. II-7.

[2] Ibid., p. II-14.

TABLE 2

THE ANNUAL BUDGET[a]

(millions of dollars)

Appropriation Title	Program III General Purpose Forces		Total
	Army Forces, Europe	Attack Carrier Strike Force	
Personnel	$100,000	$40,000	$140,000
Operations & Maintenance	50,000	90,000	140,000
Total	$150,000	$130,000	$280,000

[a]For illustration only.

Financial control is to be exercised through control of resource categories or appropriation titles. Control of program elements is to be in terms of physical performance, availability and consumption of planned quantities of men, material, supplies, and facilities. In Table 2 the two dimensions of cost-effectiveness can be seen. Cost is measured horizontally, effectiveness is measured vertically. Assuming the two above elements were to perform the same mission, all other things being equal, the Attack Carrier Strike Force would provide the greatest return for the defense dollar.[1]

[1]Ibid., p. II-13.

Further, by means of a series of matrices similar to Table 2, the Secretary of Defense can determine, ideally, the cost of the country's defense efforts in terms of programs and program elements, in terms of time, in terms of resources, in terms of money, or in any combination of the foregoing. Presently, the specific component force structure characteristics of the program element (such as air defense missile forces with sites, battalions or batteries, and missiles) are projected for the current and succeeding eight years. The Total Obligational Authority is developed by cost category (such as Research and Development) for the current and each of the succeeding five fiscal years.[1] Manpower to the nearest tenth of a thousand of total approved year-end strengths is developed for the current and each of the succeeding five years.[2]

Before relating this rather simplified picture of programming to the thesis problem it would be well to note an underlying philosophy of this approach to defense management.

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[1]Total Obligational Authority as defined by the Defense Department is the total amount of funds available for programming in a given year, regardless of the year the funds are appropriated, obligated, or expended. It includes new obligational authority, unprogrammed or reprogrammed obligational authority from prior years, reimbursements not used for replacement of inventory in kind, advance funding for programs to be financed in the future, and unobligated balances transferred from other obligations.

[2]Ibid., Appendix C, Department of Defense Instruction 7045.2, inclosure (5).

> An economically efficient solution to military problems does not imply a cheap force or a small military budget. It simply implies that whatever the military budget (or other limitation, for example, on personnel), the greatest military capabilities are developed. Since military capabilities are plural and not easily commensurate, an efficient military establishment, in the technical sense, would merely be one in which no single capability--anti-submarine, ground warfare, offensive air, and so on--could be increased without decreasing another. An optimal establishment would in addition have the right "balance" . . . . There is a conflict of interest between the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, and economy-minded Congressmen on the one hand, and the military services on the other hand when the level of the budget is in question. The military services always (and properly) want more; the economizers always (and also properly) offer resistance, or try to impose restrictions. But once the budget has been determined, there is no longer conflict of interest.
>
> In fact the choices that maximize military capability for a given budget are the choices that minimize the cost of attaining that objective.[1]

Officer Personnel

Of some twelve broad categories of naval officers, the unrestricted line officer represents approximately 61 percent of the total officers on board. Of the remaining officer categories, none exceed 8.1 percent of the total officers in active service.[2] These same comparatively small categories serve to support the unrestricted line officer in his mission, and as result, the

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[1]Hitch, op. cit., pp. 123-124.

[2]Navy Times, February 16, 1963, p. 5.

various small categories will be assumed to experience to a greater or lesser degree the same type of difficulties experienced by the unrestricted line officer category. The following table, extracted from Navy Times, will more adequately establish the line manager, the unrestricted line officer, relationship by grade totals and category totals to the total naval officer structure.

TABLE 3

NAVAL OFFICERS ON BOARD[a]
(As of November 30, 1962)

Category[b]	Flag	Capt.	Cdr.	Lcdr.	Lt.	Ltjg/Ens.	Total
Unrestricted Line	225	2218	5366	7291	10848	20229	46087
AEDO	9	131	184	138	44	46	552
EDO	16	215	252	282	114	115	994
SDO	4	166	280	202	350	173	1175
LDO	-	-	167	181	2013	3790	6151
Medical Corps	15	456	155	590	2291	-	3507
Dental Corps	4	437	116	209	910	-	1676
Medical Service Corps	-	26	156	225	380	570	1357
Nurses Corps	-	4	79	359	557	1093	2092
Supply Corps	23	287	696	978	1127	2422	5533
Chaplain Corps	2	53	164	278	333	66	896
Civil Engineer Corps	7	126	235	259	478	592	1695
Total	356	1717	8452	13433	22199	28290	76447[c]

[a]Calculated from Navy Times, February 13, 1963, p. 5.

[b]AEDO (Aeronautical Engineering Duty Only); EDO (Engineering Duty Only); SDO (Special Duty Only; LDO (Limited Duty Only).

[c]Includes Fleet Admirals, retired officers on active duty, women naval officers, and training and reserve officers (TAR).

On the other hand, requirements for the unrestricted line officer appear to vary markedly from the on-board count. This variation can be readily seen upon examination of Tables 4 and 5.

TABLE 4

NAVAL OFFICER REQUIREMENTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1964[a]
(Unrestricted Line Officers Only)

Flag	Capt	Cdr	Lcdr	Lt	Ltjg/Ens	Total
266	2290	5726	9245	16031	23369	56827

[a]Calculated from: Navy Times, February 16, 1962, p. 5.

TABLE 5

OFFICER REQUIREMENTS IN EXCESS OF OFFICERS ON BOARD[a]
(Unrestricted Line Officers Only)

Flag	Capt	Cdr	Lcdr	Lt	Ltjg/Ens	Total
41	72	360	1954	5183	3140	10840

[a]Table 4 figures less Table 3 figures.

The two dimensional problem of resources versus requirements involving line officers becomes apparent, if the formula expressed for computing net resources is recalled. At first glance the problem might seem quite easily solved, for if, indeed, all that is required is to appoint the number of persons necessary to fill the various shortages indicated in Table 5, the problem would be easy. If, for the moment, it is accepted that

the shortage is in all respects valid, this shortage might well be examined in terms of years of total service required for promotion.

TABLE 6

MINIMUM OFFICER EXPERIENCE SHORTAGE[a]

Grade	Number Short	Years at Promotion[b]	Experience Shortage[c] (man years)
Flag	41	29	1189
Capt.	72	22	1584
Cdr.	360	16	5760
Lcdr.	1954	10	19540
Lt.	5183	4	20732
	7700		48805

[a]Calculated from: Navy Department, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Officer Fact Book, NAVPERS 15898, Figure 6-4, pp. 6-8 (available in department files).

[b]Planned stabilized service at promotion to the various grades.

[c]Number short times years at promotion equals experience shortage.

Thesis Problem

Table 6, can be considered naive in many respects. Promotion attrition has been ignored, years of total service is not a measure of ability, and years of total service is not a

guarantee of required skill, to name a few. Nevertheless, Table 6 does to a degree indicate the magnitude of the experience shortage of a vital resource, the unrestricted line officer--a shortage that cannot be quickly rectified. Therefore, it might be asked, "How valid are the requirements?" or, "Are these shortages actually serious deterrents to effective national defense?" The purpose of this thesis is to examine the resource planning, the officer requirement determination, and the officer budget formulation. If the most efficient and economical national defense is to be maintained, the cost-effectiveness approach should be as applicable to human resources as to material resources. Therefore, the planning-programming-budgeting cycle will be applied to a very insignificant group in terms of dollars, but literally priceless in terms of seapower--the unrestricted line officer.

CHAPTER II

OFFICER REQUIREMENTS

Service Characteristics

Almost sixty percent of the total Navy population is assigned to an afloat craft of some kind. While these craft have varying degrees of self-sufficiency they require a certain amount of shore support. About ten percent of the Navy's personnel are based overseas, many to provide shore support to the afloat Navy.

Each ship is assigned a home port, of which approximately 87 percent are based in the continental United States. Each ship operates out of its home port, to which it must return sooner or later for repairs and service. The high degree of mobility of the Navy assures that the assignment of a ship to a home port is not always permanent. Strategic and tactical considerations are important influences in the assignment of home ports. Physical and maintenance factors involved in the upkeep of ships are also important home port assignment considerations. The problems inherent in the determination of officer requirements begin to come to the front when it is

recognized that shore facilities must move to some extent to fulfill the requirements of home ports being shifted for individual or groups of ships.

The nature of ship duty makes highly desirable the rotation of officers between afloat and ashore assignments. If this were not done, ignoring all other considerations, the production of an unquestionably unattractive home life would obviously affect the ability of the Navy to retain its expensively trained officers.

Space limitations aboard most ships increase the training requirement. In addition to the need to remain abreast of the ever increasing mechanical complexities of war, it also becomes necessary for naval officers to double up in their skills, such as, understanding both the maintenance and operation of complex machinery, as well as rather complex ever changing administrative duties.[1]

The fast changing service characteristics, both operational and administrative, create a situation that prevents most line officers, both senior and junior, from becoming an expert in any field. Most officers can only speak with

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[1]Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Management of the Military Personnel, Navy Appropriation, May, 1962, pp. III-9 to III-14 (available in department files).

experience on a subject or characteristic in which they have been involved. And only then can the officer speak for that period during which he was involved. The determination of officer requirements does not lend itself to judgment based upon anything except the volatile present. Past experience in a field is, perhaps, the greatest enemy of realistic present officer requirements.

Organization and Responsibilities

The most significant feature of the Navy's personnel operation is the utilization of the sponsor system. This system provides for the evaluation and control of personnel requirements. Every command or activity is assigned a primary or activity sponsor. These sponsors are required to be very knowledgeable about and familiar with their activities and all programs involved. The personnel sponsorship people have definite responsibilities with regard to recommending personnel allocations, implementing personnel plans, and processing billet requests.

In addition to activity sponsors, technical sponsors are also utilized in the sponsor system. Technical sponsors usually represent a bureau or office having primary interest in the type of billet involved. For example, if the problem concerns the billet for a medical officer at a supply depot, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery would be consulted as a technical sponsor,

although the activity sponsorship is under the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

The work of sponsorship is coordinated by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Personnel and Naval Reserve), assisted by the Requirements Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

The complete cycle of requirement determinations is as follows:

(1) The activity sponsor, as a result of a study of a naval activity, will advise the technical sponsors of personnel requirements in their areas. As a result of these studies the activity sponsor will report to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Personnel and Naval Reserve) the requirements of the activity in question.

(2) The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Personnel and Naval Reserve) will review the report and decide upon personnel by category requirements by number to allocate to the activity. The resulting decision is forwarded to the Requirements Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

(3) The Requirements Division within each category total assigns officer grade totals. These grade totals by activity are returned to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Personnel and Naval Reserve).

(4) The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations prepares a Manpower Allocations and Requirements Plan in which all commands

and activities are contained. This plan is forwarded to the Program Director, Plans Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel.

(5) The Program Director coordinates the efforts of the Project Manager, Active Officers Plans Branch and the Project Manager, Active Enlisted Branch.

(6) The two project managers prepare plans to meet the requirements and allocations contained in the Manpower Allocations and Requirements Plan. Among these plans are promotion plans, education plans, procurement quotas, strength plans, and financial plans.[1]

As a matter of interest, the Chief of Naval Personnel and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Personnel and Naval Reserve), two separate organizations, have, historically, been assigned to one person, a vice admiral.

Manpower Requirements

The most prominent tool used in the Navy for personnel programming is the Manpower Allocations and Requirements Plan, hereafter referred to as MARP. The MARP lists the personnel allocated to and required by all of the ships, aircraft units, and activities. It also displays the total of these requirements and allocations, and provides specific information for the

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[1] Ibid., pp. IV-1-IV-9.

analysis of personnel allocation and utilization. The MARP shows allocations for a period in advance of 18 to 30 months. It covers requirements for a period of seven years into the future. The MARP can be used in a variety of ways among which are: (1) sponsors are able to keep abreast of the activities of other sponsors; (2) functional breakdowns of personnel, i.e., operating forces, support forces, training forces, etc., are available for analysis; and (3) officer trends by category for an overall picture can be established.[1]

Billet Requirements

During the initial years of World War II, the Navy was faced with a procurement problem which increased the number of officers several hundred percent. The Bureau of Naval Personnel found it necessary to devise a system of classifying the backgrounds of reserve officers in order that their education and experience could be used in the most efficient manner.[2]

The system was so successful that a form of the system is still in effect today. A list and description of all officer

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[1] Ibid., pp. VI-1-VI-3.

[2] Navy Department, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Naval Officers Qualifications, NAVPERS 15,006, April 1, 1944, p. ii (available in department files).

billets presently required is contained in the Manual of Navy Officer Billet Classifications (NOBC), NAVPERS 15839. In spite of the possession of a detailed list of billet descriptions, there remains a problem of placing each of the billets in a time frame of professional development for all officer categories.

In January 1956, the Bureau of Naval Personnel commenced the formulation of various manuals for the officer corps to correct the above problem. The guidelines given for the formulation of a line officer's manual, for example, were: (1) to prescribe the general qualifications expected of line officers, regardless of rank, in order to discharge the responsibilities imposed by U. S. Navy regulations; (2) to prescribe the minimum qualifications for each grade; and (3) to provide the basis for professional fitness evaluations by commanding officers and selection boards.[1]

Officer-Enlisted Ratio

Amazingly enough, the number of officers allowed to the Navy by the Department of Defense has not been based upon those requirements generated by the system described herein. Rather, the number of officers has been based upon an officer-enlisted

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[1]Memorandum from the Director, Plans and Policy Control Division to the Director, Personnel Analysis Division, both of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, June 12, 1956, subject: Line Officers Qualification Manual.

ratio. For example, assuming a total allowable strength of one thousand enlisted men and an officer-enlisted ratio of one-tenth, the total allowable officer strength would be one hundred. The use of this device appears to stem from budget economy measures and some outside of the service distrust of the methods used to determine officer requirements.

At the present, the Navy is generally being granted that ratio which allows the Navy the number of officers it believes is necessary to perform all assigned functions. As a matter of fact the fiscal year officer requirements in the planning stage for fiscal year 1965, will utilize actual requirements instead of the officer-enlisted ratio. The Navy did not desire to place the programming of requirements on the base of the present requirements determination system until, at the earliest, fiscal year 1965.[1]

In order to place all personnel, officer and enlisted, on a requirements basis, as generated by the programming system, the Navy is currently conducting two studies. The first, headed by the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, is conducting a study to develop requirements and costing factors to be used for personnel and training information to be incorporated into the programming

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[1]Interview with J. H. Cooper, Department of Defense, Personnel Requirements Division, March 1, 1963.

concept. The second, headed by the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Personnel and Naval Reserve), is conducting a study to develop methods of accurately surveying needs of individual activities.[1]

Officer Assignments

The Bureau of Naval Personnel, Requirements Division in assigning a grade to the requirements also assigns a Naval Officer Basic Code covering qualifications required by the officer billet. Any further refinement in the type of individual required for the billet is accommodated in the process of detailing officers to their duty assignments. Essentially, the person performing the task of assigning officers to duty assignments attempts to meet the various billet requirements with officers available for assignment.

The task of detailing line officers takes place within the Distribution Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel. Detailers operate in two broad categories, the officer grade detailer and the type or activity detailer. The responsibility of the officer grade detailer is one of assuring that every officer is following, to as great an extent as possible, the approved professional development pattern to be discussed later. In this

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[1]Interview with Head, Programming Unit, Personnel Plans Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations (Personnel and Naval Reserve), March 6, 1963.

sense, the grade detailer might be considered as the executor of the resource planners. The responsibility of the type or activity detailer is to assure that the grade detailers know of his impending needs for officers, and that the officer nominated to him by the grade detailer meets the established billet requirements of the billet in question. The type or activity detailer then can be considered the executor of the requirements planners.

Unfortunately, billet requirements have rarely, if ever, equalled officers on board. Historically, in spite of requirements or resource planning, the Distribution Division has been forced to formulate personnel assignment policies which form a middle ground between officer requirements and actual officers. However, necessary such an adjustment may be, any deviation from planned requirements over minute adjustments, theoretically, adversely affects the capabilities of the operational Navy to an extent, heretofore, largely unevaluated.

Ideally, the Navy might consider filling those requirements for which officers are, in fact, available. Several proposals have been made which to some extent would implement this idea. However, these proposals have met with little success, primarily because present world conditions appear to require a certain military posture which has, and is, forcing the Navy to gamble in its personnel policies, perhaps too greatly.

No person appears able to estimate the cost of present officer assignment policies in effectiveness, men, material, or money.[1]

Changes in Requirements

In most cases the request for changes in requirements originates with the activity or command. These change requests are forwarded via the administrative or operational chain of command. Each commander in the chain receiving the request will review the request critically and recommend personnel compensations or changes as appropriate. The various Fleet Commanders may offer to accommodate an increase in requirements by the elimination of billets in other activities within his command. If the change cannot be absorbed, the responsible command so states. The request then reaches the sponsor who further examines it and offers billet compensation, if possible. The request is then forwarded to the Deputy Chief of Operations (Personnel and Naval Reserve) for the final determination.

The periodic visit of the Inspector General to an activity may uncover personnel manning levels requiring adjustment. The Inspector General's recommendation to the Deputy Chief of Operations (Personnel and Naval Reserve) is normally implemented upon receipt.

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[1]Various confidential sources.

Another group, the Personnel Monitoring Group in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, periodically meets to study, examine, and make recommendations to insure the maximum efficiency in the utilization of personnel, and to insure that existing personnel policies are followed.[1]

Under the present system commanding officers of various activities appear to be allowed freedom in determining or changing personnel requirements. A change in commanding officers is often the starting signal for a number of requirements request changes being submitted. This has resulted in an oscillation between two requirements for a single billet. In the aggregate, these requirements request changes have on occasion become so numerous that subsequent changes to an earlier change in the same billet have been received before the initial request could be acted upon. Except in near emergency situations there is some merit in submitting requirements change requests with the budget submission annually.[2]

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[1] Military Personnel, Navy Appropriation, op. cit., pp. VI-4=VI-5.

[2] Interview with Lieutenant E. K. Whitman, SC, USN, Fleet Support Section, Requirements Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel, March 1, 1963.

CHAPTER III

RESOURCE PLANNING

The effectiveness of any organization rests with its management. The following quotation serves to dramatically point up this statement.

> Evidence of most managements' predilection for emphasizing the value of plant and equipment to the disregard of people were effectually illustrated in a large eastern manufacturing company. In an effort to diversify its existing line of industrial products, the management secured the approval of the board of directors to organize a subsidiary division to manufacture and distribute a consumers' product. Approximately two years were spent in planning and securing the appropriate plant and equipment. When it became necessary to man the new subsidiary, sales, production, and other management personnel were transferred from the parent organization. Nothing had been done during the two year period to prepare for the management of the new subsidiary; it was assumed that competent members of an organization manufacturing and selling industrial products could automatically transfer their ability successfully to consumers' products. The first year of operation the subsidiary resulted in substantial loss. . . . When the losses during the next two years exceeded those of the first year, the board of directors promptly terminated the diversification effort, sold the plant at a further loss. . . . The president stated that the subsidiary might have succeeded if as much management attention had been given to staffing the organization with competent people as had been given to planning the requirements of physical assets.[1]

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[1]Myles L. Mace, The Growth and Development of Executives (Andover: The Andover Press, Ltd., 1950), pp. 6-7.

Professional Development

The professional development of all unrestricted line officers is divided into three equal ten year periods: (1) fundamental professional development, (2) intermediate professional development, and (3) advanced professional development. Each of the three basic periods is further subdivided for each of the three unrestricted line categories, the line surface officer, the line submarine officer, and the line aviation officer.

Surface Line Officer

Upon entering the naval service, surface line officers are assigned to large and small combatant type ships and amphibious type ships for about two years. The objective is to provide them with the maximum opportunity to acquire the necessary seagoing basic essentials in order to attain qualifications for command at sea. Those officers achieving the necessary degree of qualification are assigned department head or executive officer billets in small ships, or are assigned to afloat staffs. A very small percentage are assigned as commanding officers of small minesweepers or patrol craft. The first tours at sea are augmented to a great extent by functional schools for brief periods involving training in gunnery, missiles, engineering, anti-

submarine warfare, and many other functional areas required on board ships. After five to seven years, the officer, now a Lieutenant, may expect to be ordered to what is called the "First Sub-Specialty and Education Phase."[1]

This phase, a shore assignment, calls for further training in either a professional field or a technical field. In the professional area, the officer is assigned to a two-year tour in one of the naval agencies or bureaus, i.e., Office of Naval Operations, Bureau of Naval Personnel, etc.; or instructor duties at a NROTC unit, or the U. S. Naval Academy, or one of the many functional schools. In the technical area, the officer is enrolled in one of several postgraduate courses for which his educational and professional background appear to qualify him. Upon completion of this phase the officer begins the "Second Operational Phase."

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[1]The concept of sub-specialty came as a result of a statement made in a report to the Secretary of the Navy in 1959. The then Under Secretary of the Navy, William B. Franke, chaired a committee studying the organization of the Navy for the purpose of making recommendations to insure maximum combat effectiveness and administrative efficiency. The report stated, "Line Officers. The Navy has a major requirement for line duties in the Operating Forces. The ever-increasing technical complexity of naval equipment and weapons creates an ever-increasing need for the development and education of line officers for command positions, through postgraduate education and specialized experience." Navy Department, Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Report of the Committee on Organization of the Department of the Navy, 1959, p. 113 (available in department files).

This sea tour serves to round out the basic at-sea qualifications commenced during the initial sea tour. Depending upon the individual officer's former degree of achievement he can expect assignment as commanding officer of small auxiliary type ships or amphibious type ships. Or the officer may be assigned as executive officer of larger amphibious or small destroyer type ships. Also, some officers may be assigned to afloat staffs. Officers with postgraduate training can expect to be assigned to duty in any of the above varieties of duties which are related to their postgraduate training. Upon completing these assignments, representing about the first ten years of an officer's career, he enters the "intermediate professional development period."

This period covers the tenth through the twentieth years of an officer's service career. The first phase of this period is called the "second sub-specialty and educational phase."

During this shore period the officer assumes more responsible positions in the shore establishment. Officers with postgraduate training are normally assigned to the agency or bureau which utilizes their skills. Other officers will attend one of the junior service schools, i.e., the Naval War College (Command and Staff), Armed Services Staff College. After this two to three year tour the officer is assigned to the "first advanced operational phase."

In this phase, just prior to selection to the grade of commander, the surface line officer receives increased opportunity for command at sea. An officer, again depending upon the degree of qualification, will be assigned to more senior and demanding positions on afloat staffs. The last four years of the intermediate professional development period will be devoted to assignments varied as necessary to round out qualification requirements and to meet naval service needs. During this last four years an officer at sea may be in command of destroyers, or divisions of large minesweepers, or divisions of small destroyers. The officer may also be executive officer of cruisers, large amphibious and auxiliary type ships. Or the officer may be a department head on cruisers or carriers. On shore he will assume high level managerial duties in any one of the many agencies or bureaus of the shore establishment. Or the officer may be assigned to senior officer service schools. Ending about the twentieth year of service, the officer may soon be selected for the grade of captain and enter the "advanced professional development period."

During this final ten years the officer completes all operational training at sea and all top-level managerial training ashore. This training may consist of command of the largest ships, chief staff officer of the largest afloat staffs, or squadron commander of destroyers, minesweeps, amphibious ships, or auxiliary ships. On shore this training may consist of

planning and administering duties in the top-level managerial positions, or commanding officer of large naval bases. The active professional development of officers ends when the officer retires from the naval service. Although the professional development of officers continues in the flag grades, this development will not be considered in this thesis, mainly because flag officers represent a very small percentage of the total officer corps--less than one percent. Table 7 presents the time frame of the broad phases of professional development.

TABLE 7

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PERIODS[a]
(Surface Line Officer)

Years[b]	Grade[c]	Periods and Phases
		Fundamental Professional Development Period Phases:
1-1½	Ens.	First Operational
1½-4	Ltjg.	First Operational
5-6	Lt.	First Operational
5-6	Lt.	First Sub-Specialty and Education
6-8	Lt.	First Sub-Specialty and Education
7-10	Lt.	Second Operational Phase
		Intermediate Professional Development Period Phases:
11-14	Lcdr.	Second Sub-Specialty and Education
15-16	Lcdr.	First Advanced Operational
17-20	Cdr.	Third Sub-Specialty Education
		Advanced Professional Development Period Phases:
21-25	Capt.	Second Advanced Operational
26-30	Capt.	Final Development

[a]Calculated from: Department of Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Officer Fact Book, NAVPERS 15898, pp. 8-16.

[b]Periods in question will vary for the individual as individual and naval needs require.

[c]Ens. (Ensign); Ltjg (Lieutenant Junior Grade); Lt. (Lieutenant); Lcdr. (Lieutenant Commander), Cdr. (Commander); Capt. (Captain).

Submarine Line Officer

The submarine qualified line officer has a professional development pattern identical to the surface line officer after the first fourteen years of service, or completion of submarine duty. The first fourteen years of service are spent in training for and commanding submarines. The shore assignments of submarine line officers during the first fourteen years seek the same objectives and are identical for all practical purposes to that of the surface line officer.

Aviation Line Officer

The aviation line officer, the third and last component of the unrestricted line officer category, has a professional development pattern very much like the surface and submarine officer. The major difference is that the aviation line officer, unlike the submarine officer, can and does remain in aviation oriented operational duties for his entire career. Commanding carriers is an exclusive domain of the aviation line officer, while the submarine line officer, after completing the first fourteen or so years, can and does assume command of the same type ships that surface line officers command.[1]

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[1]Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Officer Fact Book, NAVPERS 15898, pp. 8-15-8-28 (available in department files).

Officer Promotions

Since the Congress passed the Act of March 27, 1794, providing for a "naval armament" of six ships and fifty-four officers to combat the depradations committed by the "Algerine Corsairs"[1] naval officer personnel have been considered by Congress on an average of every ten years in connection with some form of legislation. However, it was not until 1916, that the present principle of selecting officers for promotion was introduced. Several modifications of the 1916 law led up to the present system.[2]

The present system of promoting naval officers was inaugurated in 1947. However, before examining the present promotion system it is well to reflect upon the words of Dewey Short, Chairman, Subcommittee Number 1, Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, which he stated before the subcommittee April 1, 1947, prior to commencing hearings on the bill introducing the present system.

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[1]Richard Peter, ed., The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America from the Organization of the Government in 1789 to March 3, 1845, Vol. I, (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1850), p. 709.

[2]U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee No. 1, Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, To Regulate the Distribution, Promotion, and Retirement of Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, to Provide for the Advancement of Enlisted Personnel to the Commissioned Grades, and for Other Purposes, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 2393.

> This morning we begin hearings on the promotion bill. It is undoubtedly one of the most important pieces of legislation that will confront this committee at this session of Congress. . . . We are going to take our time, because it is a most complex and complicated measure. It reminded me of a professor of philosophy I had once who seemed to make the obvious obscure.
>
> It seemed to me the bill is more involved than it necessarily should be, yet the more you study it and the deeper you go into it the more you realize that it is a very complex problem with which we are dealing, and there is no simple way out.[1]

Promotion Flow

As proposed in congressional hearings, the promotion of all officers was to occur at appropriate ages to assure vigorous performance in all of the grades. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947, was to provide adequate, but not excessive, time in each grade for training and experience. At this time it was envisioned that these promotion points would under normal conditions be as shown in the following table. (Table 8)

The above promotion points and ages were considered vital. During World War II, the unusually heavy physical demands placed upon officers exercising high command demonstrated the need for a continuing vigorous and physically alert officer corps.

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[1]Ibid., p. 2393.

TABLE 8

NORMAL PROMOTION FLOW[a]
(Years)

Grade	Service in Grade Prior to Promotion	Total Service	Age[b]
Ensign	3	3	26
Lieutenant (jg)	3	6	29
Lieutenant	6	12	35
Lieutenant Commander	6	18	41
Commander	7	25	48
Captain	5	30	53

[a]Extracted from: U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee No. 1, Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, To Regulate the Distribution, Promotion, and Retirement of Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, to Provide for the Advancement of Enlisted Personnel to the Commissioned Grades, and for Other Purposes, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 2469.

[b]Assumed age at commissioning 23.

Promotion Zones and Selection for Promotion

The promotion zone principle was proposed to insure a flow of promotion consistent with the periods of normal service and to assure more promotion equality among officers. The Secretary of the Navy was to be required to calculate the size of each promotion zone, commencing with the senior man in each grade who had not previously been considered in a promotion zone by a selection board. In this calculation he would be required to estimate the number of vacancies in the next higher grades for the current and succeeding four years. The size of the zone would be set in such a manner that the percentage of officers selected would be the same for each of the years in question. The number selected for each of the five years would depend upon the vacancies occurring in the first year of the study, a new five year study being made prior to determining the number of selections to be made each year.

Those selected were to be promoted and those not selected were to be considered failed of selection. Prior to the introduction of the promotion zone concept an officer failed of selection only when the next junior officer to him was selected, and he was not. This system of selection tended to retard promotion flow, increase age in grade, and prevent selection of the more outstanding junior officers.

It was envisioned that officers would enter the promotion zone at or very close to those service in grade points indicated in Table 8. Grade distribution to be discussed later can affect these promotion points to a degree.

In order to be considered eligible for promotion to the next higher grade, an officer was to complete certain minimum periods of service in each grade.

TABLE 9

MINIMUM SERVICE IN GRADE PRIOR TO SELECTION ELIGIBILITY[a]

Grade	Minimum Service (Years)
Ensign	--
Lieutenant (jg)	4
Lieutenant	4
Lieutenant Commander	4
Commander	5
Captain	3
Total	18

[a]Extracted from: U. S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee No. 1, Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, to Regulate the Distribution, Promotion, and Retirement of Officers of the Navy and Marine, to Provide for the Advancement of Enlisted Personnel to the Commissioned Grades, and for Other Purposes, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 2470.

It can be surmised from Tables 8 and 9 that an officer could be eligible for selection and not be in the promotion zone. It must be emphasized that any officer fulfilling the minimum service in grade requirements is eligible for selection, but only those officers within the promotion zone not selected are considered failed of selection. In this way an outstanding more junior officer could be selected without necessarily resulting in the failure of selection of a more senior officer. It must be stressed that only a designated number of officers were to be selected. Therefore, for every officer selected junior to the promotion zone some officer within the promotion zone must necessarily fail of selection. However, the promotion zone does force the promotion flow of officers, which is its major purpose.

Officers Failing Selection

Those officers failing selection two or more times were to be severed or retired from the naval service as indicated in the following table. However, under normal conditions of promotion flow no officer is to be on active duty if he failed of selection more than three times at a maximum.

TABLE 10

NORMAL SEPARATION OR RETIREMENT POINTS[a]

Grade at Seconf Failure	Normal Years At Separation	Age at Separation[b]	Type of Separation
Ensign	All qualified promotion		
Lieutenant (jg)	7	30	Discharged
Lieutenant	13	35	Discharged
Lieutenant Commander	20	43	Retired
Commander	26	47	Retired
Captain	30	53	Retired

[a]Extracted from: U. S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee No. 1, Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, To Regulate the Distribution, Promotion, and Retirement of Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, to Provide for the Advancement of Enlisted Personnel to the Commissioned Grades, and for Other Purposes, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 2471.

[b]Discharged with severance pay equal to two months basic pay for each year of service. Retired at 2½ percent of basic pay for each year of service not to exceed 75 percent of basic pay.

The number of officers failed of selection was to depend upon the number of vacancies occurring in the next senior grades for the five year period and the number of officers placed in the promotion zone for the same period.

Grade Distribution

The proposed grade distribution was to be related to total unrestricted line officer strength. The following table indicates the relation between strength and grade distribution.

TABLE 11

OFFICER GRADE DISTRIBUTION[a]

Grade	Percentage of Officer Strength
Flag	0.75
Captain	6.00
Commander	12.00
Lieutenant Commander	18.00
Lieutenant	24.75
Lieutenant (jg) and Ensign	38.50
Total	100.00

[a]Extracted from: U. S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee No. 1, Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, to Regulate the Distribution, Promotion, and Retirement of Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, to Provide for the Advancement of Enlisted Personnel to the Commissioned Grades, and for Other Purposes, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 2472.

Upon this grade distribution scheme the Secretary of the Navy is to make a computation as of 1 January each year, and the resulting number in each of the various grades cannot be varied

until the following January. However, no officer is to be demoted as a result of any computation, and the number in any grade could be temporarily exceeded until the following computation, if such variances were due to an original appointment of an individual to commissioned status.[1]

Promotion Attrition

Attrition can be broken into two categories for definition purposes. The first category, called "normal" attrition, will be used to describe all officer separations from the naval service due to death, disability, retirement, discharge, or punitive measures. The second category of attrition will be called "promotion" attrition. This category will be used to describe all separations of officers from the naval service as a result of the impossibility of promoting all officers surviving "normal" attrition to the next higher grade.

Under the stable conditions described herein it was believed that the promotion attrition to each grade, with the exception of flag and lieutenant (jg), would be approximately twenty percent.[2] The normal attrition had been such that the promotion zones in the grade of commander, for example, would

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[1] Ibid., pp. 2467-2472.

[2] Ibid., p. 2575.

[illegible].

[illegible].

have been reduced to such a point during the normal service in grade of seven years that only twenty percent promotion attrition would be required in the zone. The resulting eighty percent selected was to be approximately equal to the vacancies occurring in the grade of captain, these vacancies being the result of both "normal" and "promotion" attrition.

The provisions described herein were not to be in full operation until January 1, 1957, a period of ten years after the proposed legislation was to be enacted. As might well be imagined, the temporary provisions of the proposed legislation governing the promotion of naval officers during the interim ten-year period were very closely examined by Congress.[1]

Essentially, the temporary provisions of the proposed legislation allowed certain freedom in determining the distribution and promotion flow of promotion zones to accommodate a far from ideal distribution of age groups. The following Table 12 will present to some degree the magnitude of the difference between the actual and the ideal in July, 1948.

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[1] Ibid, pp. 2573-2576.

TABLE 12

OFFICER GRADE DISTRIBUTION BY YEARS OF AGE[a]
(1 July 1948)

Grade	Actual Grades by Age[b]	Ideal Grades by Age[b]
Ensign/Lieutenant	23 to 28	23 to 29
Lieutenant	28½ to 30½	29 to 35
Lieutenant Commander	30½ to 34	35 to 41
Commander	34 to 42	41 to 48
Captain	42 to 53	48 to 53

[a]Computed from: U. S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on Armed Services, To Provide Improved Opportunity for Promotion for Certain Officers in the Naval Service and for Other Purposes, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 223.

[b]Assumed age at commissioning 23.

The proposals described herein were eventually enacted into law in 1947. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947, was modified in the Act of June 30, 1951, making the interim provisions permanent. The interim provisions are to be in effect as long as a reserve or temporary officer is serving on active duty.[1] The Officer Personnel Act of 1947, was later modified to

[1]A temporary officer, as defined by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, is an officer serving temporarily as a commissioned officer whose permanent status is in an enlisted grade.

change the grade distribution limits of officers on active duty. For all strengths above approximately 32,000 unrestricted line officers, the grades of lieutenant commander and senior became proportionately smaller than those indicated in Table 11. There were no statutory limitations on the total number of officers on active duty established for the grade of lieutenant and junior.[1]

Promotion Problems

The Officer Personnel Act of 1947, appeared to solve the problems of 1948. But as the years passed, the Korean War, and, later, the "cold war" became realities which demanded increased military readiness over that envisioned in the original act. By July 1, 1958, the promotion flow had not reached those ideals sought by the 1947 legislation. In fact, the Navy no longer appears to believe in all of the ideals sought some sixteen years ago.[2] By way of comparison the following Table 13 shows the grade distribution as of July 1, 1958, not too different, incidentally, than that of July, 1948.

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[1]Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, Sections 5001 to 8010, (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1959), pp. 75-81.

[2]Navy Times, March 27, 1963, p. 2.

TABLE 13

DISTRIBUTION OF UNRESTRICTED LINE OFFICERS[a]
(July 1, 1958)

Grade	Actual Total Service	Ideal Total Service
Ensign/Lieutenant (jg)	0 to 4½	0 to 6
Lieutenant	4½ to 11½	6 to 12
Lieutenant Commander	11½ to 14½	12 to 18
Commander	14½ to 19	18 to 25
Captain	19 to 30	25 to 30

[a]Extracted from: Navy Department, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Line Officer Personnel Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 1, July 1958, p. 7 (available in department files).

However, had the Navy been able to reach those ideals of age and grade distribution, and promotion flow, the promotion attrition by 1958 would not have been twenty percent at each promotion point. Due to a number of factors, among which were the discovery of disease prevention "wonder" drugs and the involuntary recall of officers during the Korean crisis, normal attrition was significantly lower than that believed to be true in 1947. Based upon "ideal" promotion flow and "ideal" grade distribution, promotion attrition became approximately that indicated in Table 14.

TABLE 14

PROMOTION ATTRITION[a]
(Unrestricted Line)

Grade for which Considered	Total Service at Selection	Ideal Attrition (percent)	1958 Attrition (percent)
Lieutenant	6	20	33
Lieutenant Commander	12	20	25
Commander	18	20	35
Captain	25	20	25

[a]Extracted from: U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on Armed Services, To Provide Improved Opportunity for Promotion for Certain Officers in the Naval Service, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, pp. 228-229.

"Humps" and "valleys" in grade distribution are other problems that were first noted after the Civil War. A "hump" is defined in contemporary terms as

> a disproportionate number of regular officers who were commissioned during World War II. These officers are practically all contemporaries from the standpoint of age, years of service, and experience, and they represent one-third of the regular officers of the Navy. . . . In other words, one-third of the regular officers of the Navy are contained in a 4-year time spread, while the remaining two-thirds are spread over the remaining 26 years of a 3-year career pattern.[1]

[1]U. S. House of Representatives, Providing Improved Opportunity for Certain Officers in the Naval Service, and for Other Purposes, Report No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 3.

"Valleys" are, of course, too few officers in a time spread. Unfortunately, whether a "hump" or a "valley" exists is relative to the total number of officers, both actual and desired. There is some evidence that the last legislative act providing for correction of a "hump," Public Law 86-155, may have resulted in creating a "valley" where a "hump" formerly existed. This assertion is based upon requirements and not total officer strength.[1]

Another debilitating problem involves the officer who failed of selection for commander and captain under the present planned stabilized service at promotion. (See Table 6) An officer failing to be selected for commander or captain serves five years before he can be statutorily retired. Under ideal distribution conditions the annual promotion attrition would be approximately forty percent. Under the aforementioned stabilized conditions it is possible for approximately twenty percent of the commander and lieutenant commander grades to be in a "failed of selection" status. Officers in this status often pose a problem in job assignment and morale, to say nothing of service effectiveness. Some portion of the morale problem is due undoubtedly to (1) the officer's own knowledge of his failure, and (2) the widely proclaimed results of all promotion selection boards.

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[1]Navy Department, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Bureau of Naval Personnel Instruction 1301.31B, p. 1.

Another problem centers around the premise of equality of selection opportunity among the promotion zones of the five-year study conducted annually by the Secretary of the Navy. This premise is based upon the assumption that all promotion zones are a representative sample of the total population--an assumption that, unfortunately, is statistically incorrect.

Finally, there are no provisions in law for selecting the best qualified of those line officers required for promotion to the next higher grade below the grade of rear admiral. If the assumption that there is little difference in the manner of rating the surface, submarine, and aviation line officer is made, any deviation in normal attrition between the three categories can be amplified in assessing promotion attrition. In this way "valleys" and "humps" can be created within a category, or they can be accentuated. There has historically been little difference between the promotion attrition assessed against aviation line officers and surface line officers, although these two categories have been considered for promotion at the same time by the same selection board--an odd coincidence to say the least.

Officer Training

The Navy offers a wide variety of courses designed to equip officers for their naval duties and to prepare them for greater responsibility. These courses fall into four general

categories: (1) functional and basic technical schools, (2) postgraduate schools, (3) operational, staff, and command schools, and (4) higher command schools. These categories parallel the normal periods of development in an officer's career pattern.

Functional and Basic Technical Schools

The schools are conducted for the most part during the first post commissioning phase of the officer's career, and frequently serve as refresher training courses prior to further sea and shore assignments. In general, these schools are arranged at the officer's command as needed by the individual officer to fill the requirements of his billet or forthcoming billet. These schools range in length from one-half day to nine months. They cover almost every imaginable functional area in the naval service, i.e., computer programming, anti-submarine warfare, air control, military justice, photography, and nuclear power. The limited planning done in this area is done for the most part by the individual command, the ship, submarine, or air squadron. However, most of the lengthier school terms are filled as a result of orders of fleet command or the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Further, the various fleet commands such as Commander, Cruisers and Destroyers, U. S. Atlantic Fleet often require each command to send officers to certain designated functional and technical schools before the command is considered to have an officer qualified to perform certain functions in the command.

These schools perform a valuable and indispensable function for the entire naval establishment. By far the major part of officer training is performed in this area.

Operational, Staff, and Command Schools

These courses in these schools are designed for lieutenant commanders, commanders, and junior captains. They provide the opportunity to further understand the fundamentals of warfare. In these schools there is emphasis upon the operational functions of command, organization, functions, and procedures of operational staffs. Selection of officers for these courses depends mainly on past performance and availability. Officers are automatically considered for one of the service college courses each year when they are both available for assignment and eligible from a standpoint of past performance and seniority. An officer generally is eligible when he becomes a lieutenant commander. An officer is considered available when he has served at least eighteen months of a sea or shore tour as of 1 July of the year of entry into the school. An officer remains eligible for approximately sixteen years after first becoming eligible. In the event of a selection conflict the service school will generally take precedence over postgraduate school attendance.

The operational, staff, and command courses for surface, submarine, and aviation line officers are as indicated in Table 15.

TABLE 15

OPERATIONAL, STAFF, AND COMMAND COURSES[a]
(Unrestricted Line Officers)

School	Categories	Duration (months)
Armed Forces Staff College	Surface, Submarine, and Aviation	10
Army Command and Staff	Surface, Submarine, and Aviation	5
Air Command and Staff	Surface, Submarine, and Aviation	10
Marine Corps School Senior Course[b]	Surface, Submarine, and Aviation	9
Marine Corps School Junior Course[c]	Surface, Submarine, and Aviation	9

[a]Extracted from: Navy Department, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Officer Fact Book, NAVPERS 15898, pp. 7-47 (available in department files).

[b]Senior course is for grades of captain and commander.

[c]Junior course is for grades of lieutenant commander and lieutenant.

Higher Command Schools

These schools are a continuation of the operational, staff, and command school. These courses at these schools provide a review of essentials in the exercise of command and a study of advanced phases of strategic warfare. As in the operational staff and command schools, attendance at the higher command schools is similarly automatic and is based upon eligibility and

availability. Table 16 briefly states the higher command schools to which an officer may be assigned.

TABLE 16

HIGHER COMMAND AND STAFF COURSES[a]
(Unrestricted Line Officer)

School	Duration (months)	Service or Grade
Naval War College	10	16 to 23 yrs.
National War College	10	17 to 25 yrs.
Industrial College of the Armed Services	10	17 to 23 yrs.
Army War College	10	15 to 24 yrs.
Air War College	10	Commanders
Foreign Colleges:		
Imperial Defense, London	11	Captains
NATO Defense, Paris	6	Captains
Joint Service Staff, London	6	Commanders
Spanish Navy War, Madrid	10	Commanders
German General Staff, Hamburg	12	Senior Lts.
French Naval War, Paris	13	Lieutenant Commanders
Inter-American Defense, Washington, D. C.	22 weeks	Captains

[a]Extracted from: Navy Department, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Officer Fact Book, NAVPERS 15898, pp. 7-48 and 7-49 (available in department files).

Approximately 750 officers attend the higher command and staff courses, and the operational, staff, and command courses annually.

Postgraduate Schools

> The Navy's active participation in and subsidization of educational pursuits is justifiable only on the basis of a naval need for knowledges which are otherwise unobtainable. The Navy's needs are generally termed requirements. Thus, it is on the foundation of demonstrated requirements that officer educational programs must be constructed.[1]

Past versus Present. Until just prior to World War II, the Navy's officer structure was composed entirely of career officers. Practically the sole source of the career officer was the U. S. Naval Academy. To all intents and purposes, all officers possessed college degrees. During and following World War II, rapid expansion of the career officer structure could be accomplished only by accepting large numbers of officers not possessing baccalaureate degrees. In 1959, the Navy found that thirty-nine percent of career officers were non-degree officers, as compared to one hundred percent in the 1930's. Of great interest is the fact that the overall educational level of the naval officer structure has fallen during the past two decades,

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[1]Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Report by the ad hoc Committee to the Chief of Naval Personnel on Naval Officer Education, July 17, 1959, p. B-1 (available in department files).

while that of the United States has risen.

Prior to World War II, the inferred postgraduate goal was established as an all officers requirement. By 1940, tremendous progress had been made in accomplishing this goal. More than twenty-five percent of all line officers had postgraduate backgrounds. However, due to reasons mentioned before, by 1961 only 4.2 percent of all line officers had completed postgraduate studies of any type.[1] Despite the phenomenal increase in technological complexity represented by today's Navy, the Navy is expending comparatively less in the field of officer education today than it did prior to World War II.[2] A comparison of fiscal years 1960 and 1964 training line numbers[3] with an equivalent number for each of the fiscal years from 1930 to 1940 is shown in Table 17.

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[1] Ibid., pp. B-4 and B-5.

[2] Ibid., p. B-49.

[3] The term "training line number" is used to define that portion of authorized officer strength set aside for the various scholastic programs.

TABLE 17

TRAINING LINE NUMBER COMPARISON[a]
(By fiscal years)

1960	1964	1930-1940[b]
844	1249	2459

[a]Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Report by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Chief of Naval Personnel on Naval Officer Education, July 17, 1959, p. D-16.

[b]The total number represents a representative number for each of the fiscal years in question which has been increased proportionately to be comparable to the numbers for the size officer corps represented by fiscal years 1960 and 1964.

Since the end of World War II, the Navy has recognized, but sacrificed, the goal of requiring every naval officer to possess some form of postgraduate education. By sacrificing this goal the Navy has generated a buklt-in time lag of as much as twenty years in regaining the pre-World War II educational posture.

Requirements Determination. Commencing in 1919, with a board of senior naval officers, Knox, King, and Pye, requirements have been formally studied some six times.[1] The 1919 board established the format for the ideal naval officer career pattern

[1]Knox-King-Pye Board in 1919, Pye Board in 1944, Holloway Plan in 1945, Will Board in 1948, Weakley-Daniel Board in 1956, and Cook Board in 1959.

described earlier, and this pattern is still in effect today. However, it was not until 1956 that postgraduate educational requirements were linked with job requirements. To meet the various requirements of jobs throughout the Navy, the following priority was adopted for educational programs within the Navy: (1) five-term and general line program, (2) graduate education for restricted line and staff billets, and (3) graduate education for unrestricted line officer billets.[1]

In the fiscal years between 1956 and 1960, budgetary limitations resulted in a reduction of training numbers for postgraduate education to accommodate the five-term and general line program. In 1959, the Secretary of the Navy approved a recommendation of the Chief of Naval Personnel which drastically changed the 1956 priorities. It was recommended that the five-term program be limited to very few officers, and that the general line program be abolished. Further, it was recommended that all restricted line billets through the grade of lieutenant commander be filled with unrestricted line officers possessing appropriate postgraduate education. Consequently, the postgraduate educational requirements for restricted line billets in these

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[1]The five-term and general line programs were instituted in 1946. These programs provided an opportunity for officers without degrees to gain degrees, and officers without much line officer experience to gain some education in the field. Although many officers benefitted greatly from these two programs, I have considered these programs as one-time situation educational programs. There are no planned in-puts to these programs for fiscal year 1964.

grades would be transferred to the unrestricted line.[1] Several advantages were to be gained from this change: (1) the restricted line categories could draw on officers already educated and proven in performance to fill their needs in the grades above lieutenant commander, and (2) a broad base of unrestricted line officers trained and educated in a complex technical field would provide that at-sea operational readiness so badly needed.

Presently, postgraduate educational requirements are based upon the original 4,500 billets determined in 1956. This number has increased to well over 6,000 billets since the original determination. As a matter of interest, the shortage of officers referred to in Chapter I has made impossible the utilization of all training numbers provided for fiscal year 1964.[2]

From the standpoint of cost, this manner of determining educational requirements is vastly superior to that held formerly when the requirement was a vague all-officers requirements. For comparison, this difference is on the order of 40,000 fewer postgraduate line officer educational requirements.

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[1]Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Report by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Chief of Naval Personnel on Naval Officer Education, July 17, 1959, pp. 5-6.

[2]Interview with the Assistant to the Officer Education Plans Officer, Bureau of Naval Personnel, April, 1963.

However, postgraduate education for all officers is no less desirable, if for no other reason than a broadening of individual capabilities.

The actual mechanics of determining annual postgraduate requirements is quite simple. In November of each year the Bureau of Naval Personnel forwards to each activity, or bureau, machine tabulated lists of postgraduate billet requirements as submitted the previous year. Each bureau or activity sponsor reviews the list and makes any necessary revisions, additions, or deletions. The Officer Planning Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel reviews for errors, feasibility, and duplication each of the lists submitted. Upon agreement between the interested activities and the Bureau of Naval Personnel, these requirements are then projected through the ensuing five years. As a matter of interest, the demand for officers, unrestricted and restricted, with doctorate degrees has mushroomed since the launching of the Russian Sputnik. Prior to Sputnik there were indications that a graduate education tended to limit the unrestricted line officer's qualifications for general service.[1]

Postgraduate Selections. Prior to fiscal year 1961, two main principles formed the basis for the selection system. They were: (1) voluntary application, and (2) selection by board action.

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[1]Committee for Naval Education, op. cit., p. B-28.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

This system did not prove satisfactory, primarily because voluntary applications by line officers were not in some cases great enough to support the desired selectivity for the annual input, and further, the apparently best qualified officers were not always applying for postgraduate education. Table 18 presents the problem for fiscal year 1960, as well as a representative list of postgraduate courses being offered today.[1]

In the list of recommendations made by the Chief of Naval Personnel to the Secretary of the Navy in 1959, all of which were approved, was the recommendation that officers be selected for postgraduate education in a manner similar to that utilized for the service colleges, that is, all officers are automatically considered for postgraduate education when eligible, and are selected if their potential future service appears to warrant such selection. The individual officer may express a preference for a field of postgraduate education, but he may not make formal application for that field. Ostensibly, officers are selected for that education the board believes he can complete, providing a requirement exists for that education. As a matter of practice, most officers have in the past received

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[1] Ibid., pp. B-43-B-44.

TABLE 18

TECHNICAL POSTGRADUATE SELECTIONS[a]
Fiscal Year 1960

Curriculum	Quota	Applications[b]
Special Mathematics	1	1
Advanced Science	4	0
Meteorology	38	16
Aeronautical Engineering	42	182
Civil Engineering	12	49
Communication Engineering	20	17
Naval Engineering	62	60
Engineering Electronics	34	37
Hydrographic Engineering	3	2
Mine Warfare	9	5
Naval Construction	18	50
Nuclear Engineering (Advanced)	3	5
Nuclear Engineering (Effects)	9	36
Oceanography	1	11
Operations Analysis	11	83
Ordnance Engineering	60	125
Petroleum Engineering	1	3
Chemical Engineering	1	5
Metallurgical Engineering	1	2
Naval Architecture	1	2
Business Administration	15	248
Comptrollership[c]	12	100
Management and Industrial Engineering	2	32
Naval Intelligence	30	80
Personnel Administration and Training	2	162
Religion	5	0
Law (Army JAG)	4	11
Social Science	3	92
Petroleum Administration and Management	1	8
Navy Management	66	70
Navy Management (MSTS)	7	32

[a]Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Report by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Chief of Naval Personnel on Naval Officer Education, July 17, 1959, p. B-53.

[b]First choice only.

[c]Now called Financial Management.

their preference, all other considerations being favorable.[1]

Table 19 portrays the general pattern of educational development for all unrestricted line officers. It is stressed that this table presents a pattern that little more than one-half the officers under the most favorable conditions will follow, and then, for at most during one or two educational periods during their careers.

TABLE 19

GENERAL PATTERN OF EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT[a]
(Unrestricted Line Officers)

Years of Service	Training
4 to 8	Selected postgraduate courses or Naval Science School
12 to 15	Operational Staff and Command School or Selected postgraduate courses
17 to 20	Courses at service colleges or If appropriate, postgraduate courses
22 to 24	Higher command and staff courses school or If appropriate, postgraduate courses

[a] Officer Fact Book, op. cit., pp. 7-8-7-9.

[1] Ibid., p. B-45.

Postgraduate instruction is conducted at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, and at selected civilian colleges and universities throughout the country. With the exception of civil engineering and various nontechnical subjects such as business administration and social science, all are conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Officer Evaluations

The Navy has long required that periodic evaluations be submitted on every officer. These evaluations, referred to as fitness reports, are the primary instrument used by the Navy in determining promotions, duty assignments, and educational assignments. Only in rare cases are officers interviewed by anyone for promotion, duty, or educational considerations. Fitness reports without a doubt play a crucial role in the maintenance of an effective Navy, as well as in the careers of individual naval officers. The most recent fitness report form is included herein as Figure 1.

Fitness Report

The evaluation portion of the officer fitness report is divided into four broad areas: (1) performance of duties, (2) overall evaluation, (3) desirability, and (4) leadership. In addition, comments on future assignments are solicited; comments

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FIGURE 1

:RS 310 (REV. 4-62)

REPORT ON THE FITNESS OF OFFICERS

ME (Last, first, middle)	2. GRADE	3. USN(R)	4. DESIGNATOR	5. FILE NUMBER

IIP OR STATION	7. DATE REPORTED PRESENT DUTY STATION

:CASION FOR REPORT
☐ PERIODIC ☐ DETACHMENT OF REPORTING SENIOR ☐ DETACHMENT OF OFFICER

9. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ REGULAR ☐ CONCURRENT ☐ SPECIAL

10. PERIOD OF REPORT
FROM: TO:

UTIES *(List principal duties assigned and the number of months during the period for which assigned)*

EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND DURING PERIOD OF THIS REPORT

REFERENCE HERE AND APPEND ANY COMMENDABLE OR ADVERSE REPORTS ON THIS OFFICER RECEIVED DURING THE PERIOD OF THIS REPORT

PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES *(Evaluate his performance of duty in comparison with other officers of his grade and approximate length of service)*

DUTY ASSIGNMENT	NOT OBS. OR N.A.	Outstanding performance.		Excellent performance. Frequently demonstrates outstanding performance.		Very good performance. Frequently demonstrates excellent performance.		Satisfactory performance. Basically qualified.		Inadequate performance. He is not qualified. (Adverse)
PRESENT ASSIGNMENT										*
SHIPHANDLING AND SEAMANSHIP										*
AIRMANSHIP										*
COLLATERAL DUTIES										*
AS _____ WATCH OFFICER										*
TECHNICAL SPECIALTY (_____)										*
COMMAND POTENTIAL OR ABILITY										*
ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGEMENT ABILITY										*

. OVERALL EVALUATION: (a) In comparison with other officers of his grade and approximate length of service, how would you designate this officer?
(b) For this report period indicate in (b) how many officers of his grade you have designated in each category of (a).

	NOT OBSERVED	One of the highly outstanding officers I know	A very fine officer of great value to the service	A dependable and typically effective officer	An acceptable officer	Unsatisfactory (Adverse)
(a)						*
(b)						

. DESIRABILITY: Considering (1) the possible requirements of war and peace, (2) this officer's professional and technical competence, and (3) the adaptability of this officer to the varying conditions of naval service, indicate your attitude toward having this officer under your command in the following types of assignments:

	NOT OBSERVED	Particularly desire	Prefer to most	Pleased to have	Satisfied to have	Prefer not to have (Adverse)
) OPERATIONAL						*
) STAFF OR ADMINISTRATIVE						*
) FOREIGN DUTY						*

. ENTRIES ON THIS REPORT ARE BASED ON *(Check appropriate box)*
☐ DAILY CONTACT AND CLOSE OBSERVATION ☐ FREQUENT OBSERVATION ☐ INFREQUENT OBSERVATION ☐ RECORDS AND REPORTS ONLY

. FOR FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS:

Based on your observations, for what type of duty do you consider him best qualified for his next assignment at sea and shore?

SEA _____ SHORE _____

Comment, if appropriate

9. NAME, GRADE, FILE NUMBER, DESIGNATOR AND OFFICIAL TITLE OF REPORTING SENIOR.

LEADERSHIP: In comparison with other officers of his grade and approximate length of duty assignment, to what degree has this officer exhibited the following qualities of leadership?

DEFINITIONS

STANDING - ONE out of 100 - Exceeds ALL others
EPTIONAL - One of the next top FEW - Extraordinary
ERIOR - ABOVE the great MAJORITY
ELLENT - EQUAL to the majority

ACCEPTABLE - BELOW the majority
MARGINAL - Barely satisfactory
UNSATISFACTORY

	NOT OBSERVED	1 OUT OF 100 OUTSTANDING	EXCEPTIONAL	SUPERIOR	EXCELLENT	ACCEPTABLE	MARGINAL	UNSATISFACTORY (Adverse)
PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEOGE *(Comprehension of all aspects of the profession)*								*
MORAL COURAGE *(To do what he ought to do regardless of consequences to himself)*								*
LOYALTY *(His faithfulness and allegiance to his shipmates, his command, the service and the nation)*								*
FORCE *(The positive and enthusiastic manner with which he fulfills his responsibilities)*								*
NITIATIVE *(His willingness to seek out and accept responsibility)*								*
NOUSTRY *(The zeal exhibited and energy applied in the performance of his duties)*								*
MAGINATION *(Resourcefulness, creativeness, and capacity to plan constructively)*								*
UOGMENT *(His ability to develop correct and logical conclusions)*								*
ELIABILITY *(The dependability and thoroughness exhibited in meeting responsibilities)*								*
OOPERATION *(His ability and willingness to work in harmony with others)*								*
ERSONAL BEHAVIOR *(His demeanor, disposition, sociability and sobriety)*								*
ILITARY BEARING *(His military carriage, correctness of uniform, smartness of appearance and physical fitness)*								*
ELF-EXPRESSION (ORAL) *(His ability to express himself orally)*								*
ELF-EXPRESSION (WRITTEN) *(His ability to express himself in writing)*								*

AMMENTS: *(Reporting seniors are encouraged to discuss this report with the officer, but not necessarily show it.)*

(a) Make comments regarding any strengths, special accomplishments, contributions to the Naval and National service, or minor weaknesses. (Minor weaknesses must be discussed with the officer)

Have minor weaknesses been discussed with officer? ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ NOT APPLICABLE

b) ADVERSE COMMENTS, if any. Comments in this section are mandatory for adverse or unsatisfactory marks in section 14, 15, 16 and 20. Reports containing adverse matter must be referred for statement pursuant to Art. 1701.8, Navy Regulations. Statement of officer must be attached to this report. (Marks in starred (*) boxes are adverse.)

Has officer seen this report? ☐ YES ☐ NO

) What has been the trend of his performance since your last report? ☐ FIRST REPORT ☐ IMPROVING ☐ CONSISTENT ☐ OECLINING

FORWARDED | SIGNATURE OF REPORTING SENIOR

RRENT REPORT:

ARDED | SIGNATURE OF REGULAR REPORTING SENIOR

A-44773

are desired regarding strengths, weaknesses, and service contributions; also comments on adverse marks are mandatory. As a matter of interest, an officer judged as unsatisfactory by his marking senior must make a statement which is appended to the fitness report. Further, any commendable or adverse reports received by the command during the reporting period must also be appended to the fitness report.

The performance of duty section contains eight subsections, i.e., present assignment, shiphandling, airmanship, and collateral duties. Each of these subsections must be either graded, or marked as not observed. This section contains five degrees of ability describing each of the eight subsections. These degrees of ability are provided to aid the evaluator in selecting the most appropriate level of performance. The evaluator simply checks the box under the appropriate level of performance described opposite the subsection being described.

The overall evaluation section is five degrees of an officer's overall value to the service as judged by the marking senior. In addition, the marking senior must include on the report the number of officers he placed in each of the five degrees.

The desirability section is simply five degrees of a senior's attitude toward having a particular officer under his command in three types of assignments--operational, staff or administrative, and foreign duty.

The last broad section, leadership, has fourteen subsections, i.e., professional knowledge, moral courage, loyalty, industry, imagination, self expression both oral and written, judgment, and initiative. This section has seven degrees of ability describing each of the fourteen qualities. The evaluator must select one of the seven degrees of ability, or check the not observed box provided for that purpose.

These evaluations are made on every officer at least once annually and are submitted directly to the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Therefore, at a minimum, approximately 76,000 fitness reports are received annually by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

It must be emphasized that there is only one active duty evaluation form. The same form which is used to evaluate an ensign is used to evaluate a captain. The same form which is used to evaluate an optometrist is used to evaluate a line officer, or a priest, or a photographer, or a lawyer.

Performance Discussed

Many of the methods utilized by the Bureau of Naval Personnel for reducing literally thousands of fitness reports to a manageable and intelligible form are, by necessity, closely guarded secrets known only to a few officers. Essentially, the reason for secrecy is due to officer morale considerations. Literally, any system which places a group of officers in a

lineal list based upon performance cannot avoid being biased, unfair, or incorrect in that no perfect form of evaluation appears to exist at this time. It follows that any officer may reasonably object to his own position on a performance lineal list. And, further, those officers in the lower performance areas unable to improve their lot will become discouraged, and resign, retire, or become even less effective. Any officer may review his entire file of fitness reports by visiting the Records Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, but he cannot by this review determine his own standing within his group of contemporaries. Interestingly enough, the marking senior will rarely discuss an officer's performance as reflected by the fitness report with the officer in question.

As indicated before, inasmuch as the fitness report is used almost exclusively for promotion, duty assignment and educational assignment, some device must exist for distinguishing between the best, the average, and the poor officer. The number of officers involved excludes the use of personal knowledge by an assignment officer, commonly known as a detailer. The performance index provides the initial rough cut required to reduce the number of candidates for a duty assignment to a manageable number for intelligent consideration. For example, a need may exist for the top ten percent of a contemporary group to fill positions in the various NROTC instructor staffs throughout the country. The person charged with finding and assigning the right officers to

these schools may examine the top twenty percent, based upon the performance index. It might be added, parenthetically, that practically all billets appear to require an officer in the top ten percent of his contemporary group.

Performance Index Defined

The four broad areas of the officer fitness report mentioned earlier (Figure 1) lend themselves handily and easily to the computation of a mathematical index. Each of the four areas is assigned a number for each of the five degrees of performance within that area. In the past the range zero to ten has been used, zero representing the best score. Within the performance of duty section only the subsection, present assignment, is used. The total or average of the total is used for the remaining areas. The numbers arrived at for each of the four areas are added and divided by four to arrive at a fitness report average. The averages of all fitness reports are then added and divided by the total number of fitness reports to arrive at a single performance index for each officer.

Selection boards are provided with a "brief sheet" for each officer on which each fitness report is broken down and assigned a value for each of the four areas. Oddly enough, however, no attempt is made either to compute an average mark for a fitness report, or for an officer despite requests by selection boards for some such computation.

Officers performing duty assignments and others within the Bureau of Naval Personnel have correlated much information of varying importance from continuous work with the performance index; however, this information is not given either to the promotion or selection boards. Two examples of this empirically derived information are:(1) submarine line officers have a tendency to mark all officers either outstanding or unsatisfactory; aviation line officers mark aviators on an average a little lower than the submarine officer; and surface line officers as a group mark their officers the lowest of the three; and (2) officers with high performance indices are selected for promotion almost without regard for past duty or educational assignment.

Performance Index Assumptions. Reducing every officer within a competitive group to a single performance index will necessarily be based upon a number of assumptions among which are:(1) every officer is judged by a representative sample of the different types of marking seniors for a comparable period; (2) every officer possesses the same training and educational background for a comparable period; (3) every officer has a comparable job for a comparable period; (4) every officer has comparable inside and outside influences for a comparable period; (5) every officer has been observed performing comparable tasks under the same conditions for a comparable period; and (6) every officer is judged by the same standard of performance for a

comparable period. Even a cursory examination of a group of contemporary officers will prove that none of the above assumptions is completely applicable. It must be remembered that not only do differences exist between evaluations within a broad category of the unrestricted line, but that differences exist between the broad categories of the unrestricted line. These broad categories of unrestricted line officers are considered as contemporaries when competing for promotion, jobs, and many educational opportunities. To be fair, however, it is safe to assume that any attempt to insure that all of the above assumptions are applicable to all competitive groups is not only impossible, but not in the best interests of the naval service.[1]

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[1]Various confidential sources.

CHAPTER IV

THE BUDGET

> The unique character of the cold war has given the budget a role in the formulation of security policy that it has never before possessed. During the twenties, the thirties, and the immediate post-war years the forties, the budget was a major instrument of disarmament; now it is the focal point for the formulation of a policy to build up and maintain military strength.[1]

As described in Chapter I, the budget is to provide the link between program elements and resources. This chapter will deal with manner in which this link is forged.

Budget Formulation

The essential documents from the point-of-view of the budget are the officer plans documents. These plans show the planned numbers in terms of man-year requirements for each pay grade, with an analysis of the month-to-month gains and losses anticipated during the fiscal year. Remembering that these plans are formulated in the Plans Division of the Bureau of Naval

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[1]Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955), p. 229.

Personnel as a result of the manpower allocation and requirement plan formulated by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Personnel and Naval Reserve), the first step in bringing programs and resources together into a budget appears to be taking place. Before further discussing the formulation of the officer personnel budget it will be necessary to determine the direction toward which appropriation titles in the budgeting process is working.

Applicable Appropriations

All funds appropriated for personnel are contained in two appropriation titles of the Navy budget. The first, the Military Personnel, Navy Appropriation, accounts for approximately 96 percent of the total amount appropriated for personnel. The second, the Operations and Maintenance Appropriation, accounts for the remaining four percent.

The Military Personnel Appropriation consists of four sections: (1) pay and allowances, approximately 86 percent of the total; (2) movements, permanent change of station, approximately 5 percent of the total; (3) subsistence in kind, approximately 5.3 percent; and (4) other military pay and allowances, the remainder. Each of these sections is to be used as follows:

(1) Pay and allowances, referred to as "activity one" under the appropriation title, provides all officers and enlisted men on active duty, midshipmen, aviation cadets, aviation officer candidates, nurse corps candidates, and nonpilots in the aviation officer candidate program with basic pay. And, as applicable, this section provides for all special pay such as that paid salvage divers, physicians, and dentists. In addition, severance pay, clothing allowances for officers, subsistence and quarters allowances, and hazardous duty pay, i.e., flight pay and submarine pay, are provided under this section.

(2) Subsistence in kind, referred to as "activity two" under the appropriation, provides the funds for the cost of food for enlisted personnel and officer candidates so entitled.

(3) Permanent change of station, referred to as "activity three," provides for travel, transportation, and dislocation allowances of military personnel on active duty and their dependents.

(4) Other military personnel costs, referred to as "activity four," provides for interest on deposits made by enlisted personnel, death gratuities to beneficiaries of active duty military personnel, and mortgage insurance premiums.[1]

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[1]Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Navy Budget Digest, Fiscal Year 1963, NAVEXOS P-1355, December, 1962, pp. 50-51 (available in department files). Percentages of fiscal year 1960 are almost identical.

General expenses, navy personnel, "activity one" under the Operations and Maintenance appropriation title, finances the recruiting, training, and administration of military personnel of the Navy, both regular and reserve. This includes individual and unit training in 146 naval training centers and schools, 65 civilian colleges, and 457 reserve training activities. The U. S. Naval Academy is also financed under this activity code.[1]

Derivation of Cost Factors

As stated previously, the Planning Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel provides the foundation from which the personnel budget is formulated. The Active Officer Plans Branch of the Planning Division provides the plans necessary for the officer portion of the budget. This office is composed of (1) an officer strength section, (2) an officer promotion plans section, (3) an officer procurement and release plans section, and (4) an officer education plans section.

The number of officers which governs the greatest part of the officer personnel budget, pay and allowances, have been governed in the past by: (1) the manpower and allocations requirements plan, which was governed to a great extent by the

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[1] Ibid., p. 60.

(2) officer-enlisted ratio, and the officer promotion plan. The officer promotion plans are to a great degree governed by statutes, commitments to congressional leaders and committees, and published intents to naval officers. Thus, it can be seen that the possibility of a conflict exists between the officer-enlisted ratio, set by the Defense Department upon the advice of the Bureau of the Budget, and those statutes and commitments governing officer promotions. For example, during the preparation of the fiscal year 1960 officer plans, such a conflict occurred but later was resolved. This could have resulted in a literal stoppage of officer promotions as well as severely limiting the number of ensigns to be commissioned. This conflict came as a result of a lowering of the officer-enlisted ratio, in this case only a few hundredths of a percent, to such a degree that all prospective officer losses for the fiscal year were utilized to reduce the on-board count of officers to that established by the officer-enlisted ratio. Remember, also, that as the number of officers decreases the number of officers per grade decreases. This factor quite naturally added to the controversy over the proposed officer-enlisted ratio that raged for a short time. So much for the officer-enlisted ratio.[1]

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[1]Various confidential sources.

The MARP establishes the total number of officers per category which the Plans Division must meet in its plans. It must be stressed that the Active Officer Plans Branch does not receive the required number of officers by grade. Upon receipt of these plans it is incumbent upon the Active Officers Strength Section to determine first the number of promotions, gains, per grade and category, and the number of losses per grade and category, i.e., surface line officers and aviation line officers, for the current and succeeding five years. The Active Officer Promotion Plans Section provides these estimates.[1]

The Officer Promotion Plans Section must determine the number of losses in each grade for each category for each month for the present year and for the succeeding five years. This task is not and, indeed, cannot be done accurately. Several of the factors affecting these predictions are: (1) proposed pay legislation, (2) proposed promotion plans, (3) proposed officer personnel legislation, (4) unpredicted officer strength increases or decreases, (5) changes in loss rates, normal attrition, due to advances in medical science, national economic variations in job opportunities, increases or decreases in operational activity, and (6) individual officer service opportunities. Adding to these difficulties is the fact that planners cannot base their

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[1]Interview with the Assistant to the Officer Strength Section Head, Plans Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel, March 1, 1963.

predictions upon unapproved proposals, no matter how likely the approval of a proposal may appear. The reasons are, of course, apparent from a budget point-of-view. The Officer Promotion Plans Section then must predict by grade and category for each month all officers promoted to fill the above losses. In the case of the unrestricted line the loss of an aviation officer does not necessarily result in the promotion of an aviation officer to fill that loss. Essentially, this is due to the lineal list of unrestricted line officers. Officers are placed upon this list in order of their seniority; they are selected for promotion in order of their seniority; and are promoted in order of their seniority. The promotion of an unrestricted line officer takes place only when a vacancy actually occurs in the next higher grade. Needless to say, the failure to predict the number of aviation line officers, for example, to be promoted during the year for each month and predicting the promotion of a surface line officer instead could result in a considerable difference in the amount of pay to be paid, assuming the loss predictions were correct. Obviously, these promotion predictions must necessarily involve some assumptions concerning the officers to be selected in the future.

Basically, these assumptions are: (1) each category of the unrestricted line will receive its proportion of the selections for each year, and (2) that the promotion zone can be broken into small samples of ten officers of which a percentage

will be selected equal to the predetermined selection opportunity. Parenthetically, it is surprising how close to reality these predictions have actually been in the past.[1]

Upon receiving the officer promotion plans predictions of officer gains and losses, the Officer Strength Section can then proceed to meet those requirements established by the MARP. Any differences between the totals of officers by category determined by the application of the predictions of Officer Promotion Plans and to the actual on-board count of officers is made up by the procurement of new officers for the fiscal year in question. However, such programs as the NROTC and Naval Academy programs have as much as five years lead time, four year course length and one year for procuring and processing applicants. Fortunately, the output of the NROTC and Naval Academy programs has not supplied sufficient officers, otherwise the strength planners and promotion planners would have considerably less latitude in their plans. The relief valve for the strength planners is the relatively short time necessary for the procurement, training, and commissioning of the candidates of the several officer candidate programs, from seven to ten months. However, budgetary limitations can conceivably, and have, force the recruitment of candidates during the periods most unconducive

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[1]The author performed these tasks for approximately two and one-half years. Interviews with the present Officer Promotion Plans Head indicate the procedures for prediction have not changed to any great degree.

to procurement of the necessary number of applicants. For example, an attempt to recruit the major portion of the newly graduated college students in January, instead of the preceding June, to save six months of pay and allowances, inevitably results in a lowering of standards to obtain the necessary number of graduates. Another difficulty impedes the strength planners' attainment of the Manpower Allocation and Requirements Plan.

As discussed earlier, year (age) groups must be planned so as to meet the needs for officers from five to thirty years into the future. In the case of the unrestricted line officer an inordinately large loss of surface line officers may well require the procurement of large numbers of prospective surface line officers. This procurement may well create an imbalance in the year group, because of the lessened need for aviation officers overall and the necessity for remaining within a set number of officers overall. Thus, to meet a short term need for surface line officers a serious shortage of aviation officers for the future may be created. The number of junior officers leaving the service as soon as their obligated service has been completed has created a serious and costly problem to all of the services. In this thesis the concern is for problem of prediction only. Nevertheless, from all of these considerations, and others too numerous to mention, an officer's plan for the present and succeeding five years is formulated and passed to the Active Plans Costing Branch for conversion into dollars to be spent for

pay and allowances.[1]

Costing

The costing of the officer personnel plan has its greatest significance in the pay, allowances, permanent change of station, and education activities of the appropriation budget estimates. Each activity area has its own problems and methods for arriving at an estimate. The basic principles governing these estimates will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Basic Pay. The Active Officer Plans Costing Branch arrives at its estimates by the utilization of officer strength averages per category and grade taken from the officer personnel plans, and a unit rate.

Budget rates are developed from two factors: (1) a quarterly count by rank and length of service for the last approved budget, and (2) the statutory rates of basic pay authorized by Congress.

As a first step, the numbers determined from the quarterly count for each longevity group in a particular pay grade are multiplied by the annual statutory pay rate. After the calculation for each longevity group, surface line officer, aviation line officer, and submarine line officer, the sum of all

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[1]Various confidential sources.

numbers involved is divided into the sum of all the calculated costs to produce a weighted average base pay cost for that particular pay grade. By this process annual and monthly averages are determined for each quarter for every pay grade.[1]

These rates are used to arrive at the basic pay cost estimates for the five-year force structure. However, the costs for the entire period are not basically comparable fiscal year by fiscal year. All fiscal years beyond the current budget being completed are based upon end-year strengths, while the current budget estimates are based upon man-year averages.[2] There usually exists a considerable difference between the two because, if for no other reason, of the greatly increased retirement rate for June over other months of the fiscal year, and the commissioning of Naval Academy and NROTC graduates in June of every year.

Allowances. Allowances, a part of the basic pay and allowances activity, for officers consists of allowances for quarters, allowances for subsistence, salvage diving, and aviation and submarine incentive pay to name a few. Each of these allowances is based upon a section of the officer personnel plan a portion of which has devoted to enumerating the numbers involved

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[1] Management of the Military Personnel, Navy Appropriation, op. cit., exhibit VIII, pp. 1-3.

[2] Interview with Miss M. E. McCarron, Officer Costing Analyst, Active Plans Costing Branch, Plans Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel, February 21, 1963.

in each case. A rate is derived for each allowance area in much the same way that the rate for basic pay is derived.

Permanent Change of Station. This estimate is prepared in the Permanent Change of Station Liaison Section, Distribution Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel. A rate is established from the latest known expenditure for travel costs and the average strength for the period in question. This rate is then applied to the rotation dates of all officers being rotated to other duty assignments during the current and following planning years.[1] These travel costs are estimated on a month-to-month basis and cover all travel for which an officer is reimbursed, i.e., trailer and car allowance, sea, air, and van. In order to arrive at a total cost for the entire five-year force structure, the Bureau of Naval Personnel Comptroller Division applies a rate similar to that derived above.[2]

Education. The Officer Education Plans Section provides the Education and Training Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel with training line numbers for the ensuing five-year force structure. Based upon these plans each training activity

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[1]As a matter of interest, an officer is assigned a date signifying his planned change of duty each time a set of orders changing his duty assignment is issued.

[2]Interview with the Assistant for Permanent Change of Station Liaison, Bureau of Naval Personnel, March 1, 1963.

is contacted and asked for an estimate of training costs. The training costs and numbers of officers per activity are submitted to the Bureau of Naval Personnel Comptroller Division for final conversion into cost figures.[1]

Budget Discussion

Rates used in budget estimates are generally extrapolated from observations formed through the combined efforts and judgments of personnel and fiscal planners. These rates are established, for the most part, on a subjective basis under circumstances where collective personal judgments play a great and important part. There are no routine clerical procedures for establishing mathematical formulae to measure the dollar implications of changes in promotions, gains, losses, or longevity within the officer corps.[2] However, a real need exists for more close coordination between the subjective judgments of the "expert" throughout the Bureau of Naval Personnel in the various sections involved in order to insure that a change initiated in any section immediately changes the base from which all others work.

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[1]Interviews with the Assistant to the Assistant for Plans and Coordination, Education and Training Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel, and the Training Unit Analyst, Operations and Maintenance Section, Comptroller Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel, April 12, 1963.

[2]Management of the Military Personnel, Navy Appropriation, op. cit., exhibit VIII, p. 1.

All of the estimates discussed herein and, of course, many others are received and compiled by the Comptroller Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel. This entire estimate is then forwarded through the normal chain of command in the budget cycle. The purpose up to this point has been to disciver the link between program elements and human resources. However, upon completion of an examination of the budget formulation it can be reasonably stated that the budget does not provide the direct link desired between program elements and human resources. This is recognized by both the Navy Department and the Defense Department, and a great amount of effort is currently being expended to bring about the eventual development of the necessary link.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Although the Department of the Navy, and the Bureau of Naval Personnel in particular, strive to approach the unrestricted line officer as an individual, the numbers of unrestricted line officers involved force a much less than individualistic consideration. Probably the greatest stumbling block preventing the individual approach so desired and necessary is the almost complete lack of a standard of measurement.

Statutory versus Real Requirements

In the area of officer requirements the prevailing statutes limit the number of line officers per grade for an established officer strength. Yet the changes in line officer billet requirements per grade, which change as rapidly as missions to be accomplished change, are not based upon total officer strength but upon jobs to be done. Therefore, it is not too illogical to assume that any system limiting numbers of officers per grade to a percentage of total officer strength is fallacious, be the system too stringent or too free. Such a

system is misleading and can be dangerous as long as real requirements are secondary to statutory limitations. It must be emphasized that real requirements are not necessarily a simple count of jobs to be performed. Real requirements must consider such factors as leave, travel time between stations, education, hospital time, sea time, and shore time. In an international climate of cold war concerned not only with political international confrontation but continual military action on a small scale and possible large scale conflagration, officer requirements should be limited only to that war machine being operated and procured. In many respects the human resource must be bought and developed much the same way as material resources are being bought and developed--competitively. With this in mind the annual officer budget should be based upon requirements reflecting the present situation to as great a degree as possible.

Officer Promotions versus Grade Requirements

Officer promotions have little relation to generated officer requirements in that promotions are based upon statutory grade limitations. The present officer promotion is severely limited by the definite tendency toward seniority in its application to selection for promotion. The officer assignment group must often compare the backgrounds and performances of officers from several year groups of officers to fill many

demanding billets. The detailer attempts to assign the best qualified regardless of seniority within the groups. However, the officer selected for a billet over several more senior officers may not be seriously considered for promotion from one to four years after those senior officers not considered as qualified or as effective are considered and selected for promotion. Therefore, the officer promotion system does not in all cases result in the best suited officer being promoted to meet the increased requirements of the next higher grade. Any cost-effectiveness system taken under this promotion procedure must to a degree be inaccurate and misleading.

Two promotion systems operating simultaneously appear to be highly desirable. The first, a temporary system of promotion, should concern itself with the selection and promotion of the best qualified and most effective officer regardless of seniority. The second, a permanent system, should concern itself with the promotion of officers on a system assuring personal security, personal esteem, etc., which is attractive to the plodder as well as to the brilliant officer in search of security. Further, the permanent system should equal the gains to be derived from comparable programs in industry.

Professional Development versus Performance

The professional development of line officers is divided into three equal ten year periods as described earlier. However, the extent to which an officer has developed in any one or all of

the periods is literally impossible to determine. The fitness report is not an adequate instrument from which to determine the development of either the individual or aggregate officer.

The fitness report, first, requires the essence of judgment on the part of every marking senior. Logically, the judgment factor should be reduced to an unavoidable minimum.

Secondly, the fitness report does not appear to be suited to the measurement of performance in any one of the three broad areas of professional development. The first few years an officer is largely in a supervisory position, in the second few years a middle management capacity, and the last few years in a top management capacity. During the supervisory period, particularly during the first four years, a performance measurement, which segregates these officers into thirds by the second year, is desirable. In addition, it is necessary to determine how soon an officer is ready for promotion to the next higher job, and in what general direction his talents can be best used. Failure to recognize the promising, the not so promising, and the satisfactory, and to keep them progressing within their capabilities will inevitably result in their loss to the service. A highly structured quarterly report of performance is not unthinkable. These evaluations must be applicable to the service as a whole because the individual command and, indeed, a whole fleet cannot deal with disproportionate numbers of any third of this group effectively.

The second group, middle management, should be considered from a point of job qualification and overall performance. In other words, for what is he qualified, and how well does he do it? This group forms the hard core of doers and experts. From this group top management must be selected, therefore, for the first time some indication of the personal man is desirable. Some indication of capacity for higher management duties should be sought, as well as the field in which these duties most effectively should be performed.

The final group, top management, should be marked on their demonstrated ability for top management duties, as well as numerically listing them in comparison with all other members of top management in ability to perform specific duties in top management.

The need for a better measure of performance is well known within the Navy Department, and the fitness report undergoes a continuous, close scrutiny within the Bureau of Naval Personnel. However, it appears that the opposing forces of expediency and accuracy have reduced the performance measuring instrument to an unnecessarily weak position, particularly in an era of emerging, incredibly fast, data processing systems.

Billet Requirements versus Performance

The fitness report does not specifically solicit information concerning the performance of an officer in all duties of all

assigned billets. The fitness report system as it exists is numerically overwhelming to the ultimate users, and in this respect, the information, subjective and general as it may be, is not and cannot be fully utilized by the users. The limited use of the performance index, and the preparation of a brief sheet for the various selection boards assists a great deal in correlating performance and billets. However, the fitness report as it exists tends to act as a great leveler in the hands of the marking senior, and at each review agent. The time involved between reports of performance cannot avoid the influence of the last remembered performance regardless of contributing environmental influences or number of billets assigned. In this respect the fitness report is a questionable device from which to determine billet assignment, and thereby cost-effectiveness. On the other hand, the current studies being conducted concerned with activity billet requirements indicate a less than acceptable situation in billet definition. At any rate each officer should be judged upon the accomplishment of all duties in each billet assigned in specific terms.

To do this effectively a report of performance should confine itself to an evaluation of one billet at a time. An officer should have as many reports of performance as billets assigned on each reporting date. These reports must be constructed in such a manner as to lend themselves to data processing

compilations. The use of a stylus, a punch-card, and a book of applicable billet performance questions by the marking senior may well reduce the time now spent for manual filing and review of paper fitness reports. The present annual fitness report may be properly continued as a written report of significant personal traits and social conduct, as well as a recording of expressed desires and career intents of the individual being marked. The tabulation of list of performance by individual, by billet, by grade, by background, by category, by command, and by fleet cannot be underestimated for both the derivation of present and future management effectiveness and readiness.

One further point related to the problem of combining performance and billets involves the marking senior. The evaluations and qualifications of marking seniors should be correlated with their reports not only for the benefit of those marked, but for the benefit of those concerned with the selection of officers for top management positions. To reinforce this assertion Admiral A. A. Burke during his term as Chief of Naval Operations stated in the presence of the author that he often chose officers for how they evaluated juniors, rather than by the evaluations of the officers in question.

Final Remarks

The Navy cannot with honesty manage unrestricted line officer personnel in the manner desired by the Defense Department

without many alterations to the present personnel management system. This problem is not unique to the naval service, nor even to the Defense Department. Many industries much smaller than any military service have experienced similar difficulties. While the manner of determining the cost of officers is being refined, the problem of measuring management effectiveness has only recently been considered feasible by many corporate managers and university scholars. The Navy must gamble on methods of determining officer effectiveness, rather than gamble on operational costs and readiness.

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